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Executive Summary 
 
This paper briefly reviews the IMF’s current practices and policy-making in the context of a 
proposed quadrupling of IMF resources to $1 trillion dollars, and a consequent increase in 
the Fund’s influence over economic policy-making in developing countries.  
 
In the last major set of economic crises of the 1990s, the Fund made serious mistakes that 
adversely affected the economies of Argentina, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Russia, 
Brazil, and other countries. At the time, these mistakes drew widespread criticism, including 
from prominent economists such as Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Columbia 
University’s Jeffrey Sachs.  
 
In those crises the Fund failed to act as a lender of last resort, when it was most urgently 
needed in Asia, as countries such as South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia fell victim to a severe shortage of foreign exchange. It then imposed procyclical 
policies and in some cases, such as South Korea, set unrealistic inflation targets that would 
be impossible to achieve, given the currency depreciation, without a severe economic 
contraction. The IMF’s own Independent Evaluation Office later conceded that “[I]n 
Indonesia… the depth of the collapse makes it difficult to argue that things would have been 
worse without the IMF…” 
1  
 
In Argentina, the Fund lent tens of billions of dollars to support an overvalued exchange 
rate that inevitably collapsed, while attempting to adjust the economy to this unsustainable 
exchange rate through contractionary macroeconomic policies. When the inevitable 
sovereign debt default and exchange rate collapse occurred at the end of 2001, the Fund 
again failed to act as a lender of last resort. Instead, it (together with the World Bank) 
drained a net 4 percent of GDP out of the country in 2002, while pressuring Argentina to 
pay more to its foreign creditors, and opposing some of the most important economic 
policies that facilitated Argentina’s recovery and ensuing six-years of rapid economic growth. 
 
This paper finds that the IMF is still prescribing inappropriate policies that could 
unnecessarily exacerbate economic downturns in a number of countries. In El Salvador, for 
example, the country has signed an agreement that precludes the use of expansionary fiscal 
policy. This is especially problematic because the country cannot use exchange rate policy 
and is very limited in monetary policy since it has adopted the dollar as its currency. The 
IMF agreement thus cuts off practically the only policy tool for a country that is heavily 
dependent on a contracting U.S. economy – El Salvador gets remittances amounting to 18 
percent of GDP from the United States and exports about 9.6 percent of GDP there. 
 
In Pakistan, the IMF agreement signed last December provides for tightening both fiscal and 
monetary policy, including a sharp reduction in the fiscal deficit from 7.4 percent of GDP 
last year to 4.2 percent of GDP for the current fiscal year. It is questionable whether such 
policies are necessary, especially given that the country’s current account deficit has largely 
disappeared, and inflation has fallen considerably since last October. Furthermore, the 
 
1 IMF Independent Evaluation Office. (2003). “The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crisis: Indonesia, Korea, 
Brazil,” p. 38. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 
<http://www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/pdf/07282003/main.pdf> Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 4 
country is facing a number of external shocks, including declining exports and capital 
inflows. 
 
The Fund has also prescribed fiscal tightening for Ukraine, where GDP is now projected to 
decline by 9 percent in 2009. The IMF Standby Arrangement approved in October 2008 
provided for a zero fiscal balance. At the time, the country was undergoing a number of 
severe negative external shocks: the price of Ukraine’s steel exports, which amount to 15 
percent of GDP, had fallen by 65 percent; Russia had decided to phase out natural gas 
subsidies, implying a price increase of up to 80 percent in gas imports, which amounts to 6 
percent of GDP; and a slowdown in capital inflows due to the international financial crisis. 
It was also suffering from liquidity strains and falling confidence in the banking system. 
Given these conditions, and the fact that Ukraine’s gross public debt is a very low 10.6 
percent of GDP, the agreed upon fiscal tightening would appear to be inappropriate. 
 
Hungary, Georgia, Latvia, Serbia, and Belarus all have signed IMF agreements that provide 
for fiscal tightening that could unnecessarily exacerbate these countries’ economic 
downturns. 
 
The Fund may also have contributed to the vulnerability of countries in the current crisis, as 
it did in the run-up to the Asian crisis a decade ago. For example, the Fund has supported 
the liberalization of capital flows, as well as inflation targeting. Central banks that have 
targeted a specific inflation rate tend to let the currency appreciate, which encourages the 
private sector to borrow in foreign currency. This foreign borrowing has made many 
countries more vulnerable to the current crisis, because households and firms are hit 
especially hard when the currency depreciates. This also limits the ability of countries to 
ameliorate the crisis by allowing the currency to depreciate. The IMF has also generally 
opposed capital controls, which can help governments stem the loss of reserves, currency 
crashes, and other problems associated with large capital outflows. This cuts off an 
important policy tool and makes governments more dependent on tightening fiscal and 
monetary policy to resolve balance of payments difficulties. 
 
The main purpose of having international institutions to provide hard currency lending, 
especially in a time of world recession, is to allow countries that would otherwise be 
prevented by balance of payments problems from pursuing expansionary (counter-cyclical) 
policies to do so. China, for example, is able to implement one of the largest stimulus 
packages in the world because it has $1.95 trillion in reserves. The resources of the IMF 
should be used to allow and encourage counter-cyclical policies wherever possible, not 
procyclical policies. 
 
The IMF’s current lending practices have implications for the immediate future of the 
affected countries, because procyclical policies can exacerbate the world economic 
downturn.  But more importantly, the proposed quadrupling of IMF resources will have 
implications for many years to come, even after the world economy recovers. Although the 
new resources are unlikely to reverse the trend of governments avoiding, whenever possible, 
the Fund’s lending and influence, they will help to re-establish an unreformed IMF as a 
major power in economic and decision-making in low-and-middle income countries, with 
little or no voice for these countries in the IMF’s decision-making. This could have long-
term implications for growth, development, and social indicators in many countries. Should Reform be a Requirement for Increasing the Fund’s Resources? • 5  
 
Governments that are contributing to this increase in funding should think carefully about 
these implications and the possibilities of making such increases contingent on serious 
reforms of the IMF – especially in the areas of governance and accountability. 
 Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 6 
Introduction 
 
At the last meeting of the G-20 in London on April 2, 2009, an agreement was reached to 
increase the resources of the International Monetary Fund by up to $750 billion (USD), for a 
total that could reach $1 trillion.  
 
Much of the increase in funding for the IMF still has to be approved by the governments of 
the contributing countries.   
 
The assumption was that the increase in resources for the Fund would allow it to help low- 
and middle-income countries that face severe problems during the current economic crisis. 
Certainly there are many such countries that are in need of assistance as the world recession 
continues to deepen. However, this was also true during the last major economic crisis of 
1997-1999, which began in Asia and spread to Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and numerous other 
countries.  
 
During that time and for some years afterwards, the IMF was widely criticized for having 
prescribed inappropriate and even procyclical macroeconomic policies that worsened the 
economic situation in countries that borrowed from the Fund. Among the critics were 
prominent economists. Jeffrey Sachs, currently Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia 
University, called the IMF “the Typhoid Mary of emerging markets, spreading recessions in 
country after country.”
2 Nobel Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz, who was then Chief 
Economist at the World Bank, also criticized the Fund for its mishandling of the Asian 
crisis, and went on to write systematic critiques of a number of IMF policies: for an 
unrealistic “market fundamentalism,” for maintaining overvalued exchange rates for the 
benefit of foreign investors, for “pursuing policies that are in the interests of creditors,” and 
other errors of analysis and judgment.
3 
 
Such errors were clear in the Fund’s handling of the crises of the 1990s.
 4 The Fund failed to 
act as a lender of last resort, when it was most urgently needed in Asia, as countries such as 
South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia fell victim to a severe 
shortage of foreign exchange. It then imposed procyclical policies and in some cases, such as 
South Korea, set unrealistic inflation targets that would be impossible to achieve, given the 
currency depreciation, without a severe economic contraction. In Indonesia the IMF also 
failed to arrange a rollover of the short-term foreign debt owed by Indonesian non-financial 
firms. Indonesia was thus unable to stabilize its currency and economy, and firms could not 
obtain the necessary credits for essential imports and even exports. The IMF’s own 
Independent Evaluation Office later conceded that “[I]n Indonesia… the depth of the 
collapse makes it difficult to argue that things would have been worse without the IMF…”
5 
                                                 
2 Sachs, Jeffrey. “Rule of the Ruble.” The New York Times. June 4, 1998. 
3 Stiglitz, Joseph. (2003). “Globalization and its Discontents.” New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc.  
4 For a review of these policy failures and their impact on the IMF and its relations with borrowing countries, 
see Weisbrot, Mark. (2007). “Ten Years After: The Lasting Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis,” in Ten Years 
After: Revisiting the Asian Financial Crisis. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars.  
p 105-118. 
5 IMF Independent Evaluation Office. (2003). “The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crisis: Indonesia, Korea, 
Brazil,” p. 38. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 
<http://www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/pdf/07282003/main.pdf> Should Reform be a Requirement for Increasing the Fund’s Resources? • 7  
 
                                                
In Argentina, the Fund lent tens of billions of dollars to support an overvalued exchange 
rate that inevitably collapsed, while attempting to adjust the economy to this unsustainable 
exchange rate through contractionary macroeconomic policies. When the inevitable 
sovereign debt default and exchange rate collapse occurred at the end of 2001, the Fund 
again failed to act as a lender of last resort. Instead, it (together with the World Bank) 
drained a net 4 percent of GDP out of the country in 2002, while pressuring Argentina to 
pay more to its foreign creditors, and opposing some of the most important economic 




Partly as a result of these experiences, many middle-income countries “self-insured” and 
piled up reserves that would enable them to avoid any need to borrow from the IMF. From 
2003-2007, the Fund’s loan portfolio practically disappeared, shrinking from $105 billion to 
less than $10 billion. Just two countries, Turkey and Pakistan, owed most of the $10 billion. 
This collapse in lending was partly due to the relative growth and stability in the world 
economy during this period, and the lack of major financial crises – as the Fund has argued. 
But there is no doubt that it is also due to the fact that governments actively sought to avoid 
the IMF’s influence, in some cases even paying off large amounts of outstanding debt (Brazil 
$15 billion, Argentina $9.8 billion)
7 in order to clear their books with the IMF entirely. 
 
The IMF has occasionally, although very rarely, acknowledged having made policy mistakes.   
In April 2007 the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office released a report that examined the 
experience of 29 Sub-Saharan African countries that underwent Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF) programs, and were therefore subject to IMF conditions, from 
1999-2005. The report was highly critical of the IMF's role, and among other findings noted 
that nearly three-quarters of the aid money reaching these countries was not spent. Rather, at 
the IMF's urging, this money was used to pay off debt and to add to reserves.
8 
 
But the Fund has not taken any institutional measures to hold anyone accountable for results 
that were in some cases economically disastrous -- e.g. Russia, Argentina, and Indonesia. As 
Stiglitz has noted: “It has never asked why the mistakes had occurred, what was wrong with 




6 See, Weisbrot, Mark and Luis Sandoval. (2007). “Argentina's Economic Recovery: Policy Choices and 
Implications.” Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 
http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/argentina-s-economic-recovery-policy-choices-and-
implications/; Frenkel, Roberto and Martín Rapetti. (2007). “Argentina’s Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 
after the Convertibility Regime Collapse.” Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research. 
Accessed online on April 20, 2009 < http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/argentinas-
monetary-and-exchange-rate-policies-after-the-convertibility-regime-collapse/>; Cibils, Alan, Mark Weisbrot 
and Debayani Kar. (2003). “Argentina Since Default: the IMF and the Depression.” Washington, DC: Center 
for Economic and Policy Research. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/argentina-since-default-the-imf-and-the-depression/>. 
7 “Argentina announces early payment of IMF debt.” Associated Press. December 15, 2005. Accessed online 
on April 21, 2009 < http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14093&ArticleId=209037>. 
8 IMF Independent Evaluation Office. (2007) “An Evaluation of The IMF and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.” 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 < http://www.ieo-
imf.org/eval/complete/pdf/03122007/report.pdf> 
9 Stiglitz, Joseph. (2003). “Globalization and its Discontents,” p. 230. New York: W.W. Norton & Company 
Inc.,  Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 8 
The Fund has made some changes with regard to some of the conditions attached to its 
lending. In response to the criticisms of the Meltzer Commission, established by the U.S. 
Congress to examine the lending of the IMF and World Bank in the wake of the late 90s 
failures, the IMF reduced the number of structural conditions attached to its lending. (These 
are conditions such as privatizations, pension or labor market reforms that were often 
unpopular because of their adverse impacts on lower and middle-income wage earners).  
 
The Fund has recently committed to eliminating “structural performance criteria” in future 
loans starting on May 1. However IMF statements made it clear that this does not mean that 
the Fund will stop negotiating structural reforms in its agreements. 
 
In October 2008, the IMF announced a new lending option, the Short-Term Liquidity 
Facility (SLF) that would not carry any conditions for the borrowing country. While there 
were no conditions attached to this type of loan, the IMF did require pre-conditions. Eligible 
countries had to have “track records of sound policies, access to capital markets and 
sustainable debt burdens”.
10 On the policy side, eligible countries were expected to have 
strong fiscal positions, low and stable inflation, sustainable current account balances and a 
strong international reserves position.  But there were no takers for these loans.  
 
The Fund then introduced another facility in March, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), similar 
to the SLF but with longer repayment terms and the ability to tap the funding as needed.  
 
But the institution has not been reformed, and the question remains whether it can be 
expected, in this current crisis, to pursue appropriate macroeconomic policies in its lending; 
or whether it is necessary to insist upon reforms as a condition of any new infusion of funds. 
This paper will examine this question in light of the Fund’s recent activities and in the 
context of the global economic recession. 
 
                                                 
10 IMF External Relations Department. “Press Release: IMF Creates Short-Term Liquidity Facility for Market-
Access Countries.” October 29, 2008. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr08262.htm> See also, “A New Facility for Market Access 
Countries – The Short-Term Liquidity Facility – Proposed Decision.” IMF Proposed Decision. October 27, 
2008. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/102708.pdf > Should Reform be a Requirement for Increasing the Fund’s Resources? • 9  
 
                                                
Balance of Payments Support During a Recession 
 
It is important to recognize that the main purpose of providing balance of payments support 
to a developing country in a time of recession or approaching recession is to enable the 
government to pursue the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies necessary to stabilize 
the economy. The United States, for example, is countering the current recession with policy 
interest rates lowered to zero, quantitative easing (including the financing of some $1.7 
trillion of debt through the creation of money), and an expansionary fiscal policy involving a 
proposed budget deficit of 13.1 percent of GDP for 2009
11 – more than double the size of 
any deficit in the post-World-War II era. 
 
The main reason that many low- and middle-income countries cannot pursue similar policies 
is that they can run into balance of payments difficulties and foreign exchange constraints. 
To illustrate by counter-example, China has accumulated $1.9 trillion in foreign exchange 
reserves. As a result, it is in a situation that is similar to that of the United States, in that it 
can spend as much as it chooses in order to stimulate the economy, and also pursue an 
expansionary monetary policy, without worrying about foreign exchange constraints.  
 
A country that is running a current account deficit and – due to the crisis – is no longer 
receiving enough foreign capital inflows in order to finance such a deficit, is in a very 
different situation. 
 
Any increase in growth relative to the baseline will tend to worsen a country’s balance of 
trade and therefore current account balance. This is because imports will tend to grow faster 
than exports.  Also, if investors see fiscal or monetary policies that they think will lower the 
value of the domestic currency, this may promote further capital flight, which worsens the 
balance of payments problem. Also, if the domestic currency drops precipitously, this can 
cause balance sheet problems in countries where the private or public sector has borrowed 
heavily in foreign currency. 
 
Thus, the purpose of providing balance of payments support, as is done through an 
institution such as the IMF, is preferably to allow the country to continue growing while 
gradually reducing its current account deficit to a sustainable level. Indeed, at a time like this, 
when the world economy is actually projected to shrink by 2.75 percent, for the first time in 
60 years, a strong argument could be made that balance of payments support should be 
provided without any procyclical policy changes for at least the next two years. In other 
words, we would not expect interest rate hikes, monetary tightening, spending cuts or tax 
increases during this time.  
 
Of course, a country can reduce its current account deficit by reducing its growth and 
therefore reducing imports. A severe recession can improve the trade balance rather quickly, 
as happened in Argentina from 1998-2002.  A country can also sometimes attract more 
foreign capital through higher interest rates, which also slows the economy. But these 
measures should be avoided in a time of national and world recession. The main purpose of 
 
11 Congressional Budget Office. “A Preliminary Analysis of the President's Budget and an Update of CBO's 
Budget and Economic Outlook.” March 20, 2009. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 
<http://cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10014> Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 10 
providing hard currency to countries in a time of falling aggregate demand should be to 
enable them to pursue expansionary rather than procyclical policies. 
 
There may be an argument that in some cases, a country is on a path that is so wildly 
unsustainable – either in its balance of payments or its public borrowing – that adjustment 
must begin immediately, even in the midst of a steep downturn. But even in such a case the 




In recent months, the IMF has repeatedly emphasized the need for counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies in order to prevent the world recession from deepening and to 
speed recovery. A recent IMF staff paper reads: “The International Monetary Fund has 
called for fiscal stimulus in as many countries as possible, including emerging market and 
advanced economies.”
12 However, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn has 
also stated: “Of course, not every country can undertake fiscal stimulus . . . Some will need 
to contract their budgets rather than expand them.”
13 
 
If we look at the agreements that the IMF has negotiated since September of last year, we 
find that all of them contain procyclical policies.
14  For example, they all require countries to 
reduce their fiscal deficit, mostly through spending cuts. It is questionable in most or 
possibly all of these cases whether this is the appropriate policy in the face of serious 
contractions in private spending. 
 
In one agreement - El Salvador’s January 2009 Standby Arrangement - there is hardly any 
fiscal tightening. The target for the fiscal deficit is 2.8 percent for 2009, as compared with a 
2.9 percent projected deficit for 2008. However, this is much worse than it seems. In 2001, 
El Salvador adopted the U.S. dollar as its national currency. It therefore cannot use exchange 
rate policy –i.e. depreciation – to stimulate its economy. On the contrary, the rush to the 
relative safety of the U.S. government-guaranteed financial system and the U.S. dollar over 
the last 12 months has caused the dollar to appreciate substantially against other currencies. 
The use of the U.S. dollar also eliminates most options with regard to counter-cyclical 
monetary policy.  
 
                                                 
12 Freedman, Charles et al. “The Case for Global Fiscal Stimulus,” IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/09/03, 
March 6, 2009. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0903.pdf> 
13 Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund.  Speech at the 44th 
SEACEN Governors' Conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. February 7, 2009. Accessed online on April 20, 
2009 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/020709.htm> 
14 For a summary of most of these agreements, see: Muchhala, Bhumika. (2009). “The IMF's Financial Crisis 
Loans: No change in conditionalities” Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network. Accessed online on April 20, 
2009 <http://twnside.org.sg/title2/finance/2009/twninfofinance20090302.htm> 
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El Salvador receives remittances of about 18 percent of GDP from the United States. The 
rate of growth of these remittances began to fall in 2006. Since October, the monthly year-
over-year growth in remittances has been continuously negative (See Table 1). It is worth 
noting that the 6.7 percent drop in remittances in the month of March amounts to a sizeable 
drop in income for the country, relative to a year ago, about 1.2 per cent of GDP.  
 
TABLE 1 
El Salvador: Monthly Inflow of Remittances 
   Remittances 
   (US$ millions)  (yoy, % change) 
   2007 
January  270.9  14.0 
February  269.0  7.7 
March  320.2  3.5 
April  310.3  13.2 
May  338.0  2.2 
June  310.0  7.0 
July  324.6  13.9 
August  312.2  6.3 
September  281.6  3.8 
October  323.8  7.6 
November  283.5  1.4 
December  351.1  0.6 
   2008 
January  275.5 1.7 
February  298.3 10.9 
March  338.4 5.7 
April  338.5 9.1 
May  353.4 4.6 
June  334.4 7.9 
July  332.1 2.3 
August  305.7 -2.1 
September  304.7 8.2 
October  304.3 -6.0 
November  264.8 -6.6 
December  337.5 -3.9 
   2009 
January  252.4  -8.4 
February  275.1  -7.8 
March  315.8  -6.7 
Source: Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador. Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 12 
TABLE 2 
El Salvador: Measures of Economic Activity 
(year-over-year percent change) 
Year and 
Quarter  Real GDP Growth 




2005-Q1  2.29  1.96  3.29 
2005-Q2  2.97  5.39  4.24 
2005-Q3  3.45  3.83  5.59 
2005-Q4  3.61  6.22  7.49 
2006-Q1  4.43 5.13 4.70 
2006-Q2  4.25 5.93 3.02 
2006-Q3  4.14 4.85 1.59 
2006-Q4  3.92 5.55 1.47 
2007-Q1  4.22  5.68  4.11 
2007-Q2  4.61  4.92  5.07 
2007-Q3  4.81  4.37  4.30 
2007-Q4  4.95  6.12  3.38 
2008-Q1  3.35 3.29 2.25 
2008-Q2  2.92 4.98 0.99 
2008-Q3  2.16 0.96 0.28 
2008-Q4  1.79 -4.65 0.04 
2009-Q1  …  -4.74
/1  0.06
/2 
Source: Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador. 
Notes: 
  1/ Data refer to January 2009 only. 
  2/ Data refer to the January-February 2009 period only. 
 
El Salvador also exports about 9.6 percent of GDP to the United States. The IMF also 
forecasts a sharp drop in foreign capital inflows, from 3.3 percent of GDP for 2008 to just 
0.3 percent for this year. The most recent available figures from El Salvador’s Central Bank 
show that economic activity decelerated in the last quarter of 2008 (see Table 2). Given El 
Salvador’s large dependency on U.S. remittances and trade, further substantial shocks are 
likely as the U.S. recession continues throughout this year and possibly into the next year. 
 
By restricting El Salvador from further government spending, the IMF Standby 
Arrangement is preventing the government from using practically its only remaining policy 
tool to counteract severe external shocks to its economy.  This could worsen the country’s 
downturn significantly beyond what it would be if expansionary fiscal policy were allowed.  
 
The other countries that have signed IMF agreements during the last seven months have 
mostly agreed to much more fiscal tightening. For example, Pakistan’s Standby Arrangement 
of October 2008 provides for a reduction of the fiscal deficit from 7.4 percent of GDP last 
year to 4.2 percent of GDP for the current fiscal year. (The fiscal year begins in July). While 
this might be a desirable goal, it is questionable whether this reduction should all be done 
this year, when the economy is suffering from a number of external shocks that are reducing 
private demand.  
 Should Reform be a Requirement for Increasing the Fund’s Resources? • 13  
 
Pakistan’s exports for the first quarter of this year (January-March) are down 16.8% per cent 
from the previous year, due to falling demand among Pakistan’s main trading partners. 
 
Foreign portfolio investment has collapsed over the last two years, from $3.3 billion in FY 
2007 to negative $53 million and negative $957 million for the July-March period of the last 




Pakistan also depends significantly on remittances from workers abroad, for example in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. In 2007/2008 these remittances were 4 percent of 
GDP. These remittances have held up so far (through February), but they can be expected 
to decline, as remittances worldwide are falling. 
 
At the time this agreement was signed, there was every reason to believe that these negative 
demand shocks would get worse. To commit to a deficit reduction of this magnitude in the 
face of such conditions seems inappropriate. 
 
The Standby Arrangement also states as one of its key elements that “Monetary policy will 
be tightened… The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) recently increased its discount rate by 200 
basis points to 15 percent and stands ready to further tighten monetary conditions, as 
needed . . .”
17 This will also tend to slow growth. 
 
TABLE 3 
Pakistan: Current Account Balance 
(US$ millions, seasonally-adjusted data) 
   Current Account Balance 
   2008 
July  -832 
August  -1,353 
September  -1,285 
October  -2,579 
November  -95 
December  -426 
   2009 
January -33 
February 133 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
Are these measures necessary? One argument on the IMF side would be that the 
contractionary fiscal policy is necessary to bring down the current account deficit, which 
shot up to 8.4 percent of GDP in FY 2008. However, in the current fiscal year (since July 
                                                 
15 “Pakistan: Request for Stand-By Arrangement”, p. 33. IMF Staff Report, No. 08/364, November 20, 2008, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08364.pdf>   
16  “Net Inflow of Foreign Investment in Pakistan, by Geographical Origin.” State Bank of Pakistan, April 14, 
2009. Accessed online on April 20, 2009 <http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/Netinflow.pdf> 
17 “Pakistan: Request for Stand-By Arrangement”, p. 6. IMF Staff Report, No. 08/364, November 20, 2008, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08364.pdf>   
 Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 14 
2008), this deficit has already disappeared (see Table 3). A large part of the prior increase in 
the current account deficit, probably about a third, was due to oil prices, which peaked in 
July of 2008; the collapse of oil prices since then eliminated a big part of the current account 
deficit. A large reduction in other imports – which so far have declined much faster than 
exports – got rid of most of the rest of the deficit. 
 
Thus, although the current account deficit was sizeable at the time of this agreement, it 
appears to have been rapidly reducible. Also, in May of 2008, because of balance of 
payments problems, the government of Pakistan adopted a number of foreign exchange and 
import measures, which probably contributed to the elimination of the current account 
deficit, including the reduction on the import side.
18  
 
It is worth noting that this agreement provides for Pakistan to get rid of one of the recently 
proposed exchange controls: the limit of 25% percent for advance payments on imports. 
This raises another question about IMF policy choices in this agreement, as well as a more 
general problem with the Fund’s policy choices. The IMF has had a long-standing 
opposition to capital controls. In the case of Pakistan’s current account deficit, it might make 
sense to rely more on foreign exchange controls to reduce the current account deficit, rather 
than reducing imports by bringing down aggregate demand and therefore output and 
employment. But the Fund appears to favor the latter option. The tightening of monetary 
policy is also relevant here: according to the Fund, this is necessary partly to restore investor 
confidence and reduce capital flight. But capital controls could also contribute to a solution 
to this problem. Thus, the Fund’s preferences may cause it to reject viable options that 
would allow for higher growth, more employment, and lower poverty rates. 
 
The other rationale for tightening fiscal and monetary policy in Pakistan, despite an 
economic slowdown, is to reduce inflation. Consumer price inflation averaged 7.8 percent 
for the 2007 fiscal year but shot up to an annual rate of 25 percent in October 2008, with 
core inflation at 18 percent. The idea is that this inflation posed a serious enough threat to 
justify the contractionary policies even in the face of falling aggregate demand. But here, too, 
the IMF’s fears may have been exaggerated. Table 4 shows annual, monthly, and year-over-
year consumer price inflation in Pakistan. As can be seen from the year-over-year figures, 
inflation has fallen from 25.3 percent in August to 19.1 percent in March. It is possible that 
measures taken in accordance with the IMF agreement since October contributed to the fall 
in inflation, but it is more likely that the collapse of commodity prices, as well as deflationary 
pressures both domestically and worldwide contributed to the decline. This indicates that the 
Fund was too willing to sacrifice output and employment in order to bring down inflation. 
                                                 
18 According to the IMF, these measures included “(i) a 25 percent limit on advance payments for imports of 
goods (an exchange restriction subject to Fund approval under Article VIII, Section 2(a)); (ii) the requirement 
for exchange bureaus to repatriate foreign exchange from their accounts abroad and to sell 25 percent of any 
foreign exchange receipts in the interbank market; (iii) prior SBP consent for outward remittances of more than 
$50,000 upon verification of the bona fide nature of the payment; and (iv) a margin requirement of 35 percent 
for the opening of letters of credit for non-essential imports. With regard to this latter measure, which was 
introduced at a later date, staff is obtaining additional information from the authorities in order to assess its 
jurisdictional implications. In addition, the government recently imposed regulatory duties on imports of luxury 
items.” 
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TABLE 4 
Pakistan: General Inflation Rates 
(percent changes) 
 
 Annual    Year-over-year  Monthly 
2000  3.6     2008 
2001  4.4  March  14.1  3.1 
2002  3.5  April  17.2  3.0 
2003  3.1  May  19.3  2.7 
2004  4.6  June  21.5  2.1 
2005  9.3  July  24.3  3.3 
2006  7.9  August  25.3  2.1 
2007  7.8  September  23.9  1.0 
2008  12.0  October  25.0  2.1 
   November  24.7  -0.1 
      2009 
   December  23.3 -0.5 
   January  20.5 -0.4 
   February  21.1 1.0 
      March  19.1 1.4 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
In a measure which has not been common in IMF Standby Arrangements, the agreement 
provides for an increase in spending on the social safety net, in recognition that the 
contractionary macroeconomic policies in the agreement could have adverse impacts on the 
poor. However, the amount of spending committed is very small – just 0.3 percent of GDP. 
It is not clear that this would keep poverty from rising, given the pressures on employment 
and output that follow from the agreed-upon macroeconomic policies, as well as the cuts in 
energy subsidies that are included in the agreement. 
 
The Fund has also prescribed fiscal tightening for Ukraine, where GDP is now projected to 
decline by 9 percent in 2009. The IMF Standby Arrangement approved in October 2008 
provided for a zero fiscal balance. At the time, the country was undergoing a number of 
severe negative external shocks: the price of the Ukraine’s steel exports, which amount to 15 
percent of GDP, had fallen by 65 percent; Russia had decided to phase out natural gas 
subsidies, implying a price increase of up to 80 percent in gas imports, which amounts to 6 
percent of GDP; and a slowdown in capital inflows due to the international financial crisis. 
It was also suffering from liquidity strains and falling confidence in the banking system. 
Given these conditions, and the fact that Ukraine’s gross public debt is a very low 10.6 
percent of GDP, the agreed upon fiscal tightening would appear to be inappropriate. 
 
The IMF’s fiscal target of a balanced budget proved to be politically unrealistic in Ukraine. 
In early 2009, the IMF suspended the second disbursement of the loan after failing to reach 
an agreement with the Ukrainian authorities over a budget deficit. Most recently, on April 
17, an agreement was reached on a deficit of 4 percent of GDP. But it is important to 
emphasize that this revision was made only after a struggle with the Fund and the refusal of 
Ukraine's parliament to accept Fund conditions (they were approved unilaterally by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 16 
executive).
19 The IMF Standby Arrangement for Ukraine also prescribes monetary 
tightening, and that foreign exchange controls be eliminated as soon as possible. These latter 
policies are also questionable in Ukraine’s situation. There has been considerable pressure on 
the domestic currency, which had depreciated by about 25 percent in the months before the 
agreement. This causes special problems for Ukraine because of a high level of private 
borrowing in foreign currency. At the same time, Ukraine was running a current account 
deficit of 6.2 percent of GDP and depleting reserves trying to defend the currency. In this 
situation, foreign exchange controls may be a more sensible means of ameliorating the 
current account and balance of payments problems, rather than relying solely on fiscal and 
monetary tightening, which exacerbate the recession. 
 
Hungary, Georgia, Latvia, Serbia, and Belarus all have signed IMF agreements that provide 




                                                 
19 Olearchyk, Roman. “IMF set to unlock loan to Ukraine.” Financial Times. April 18, 2009. Accessed online on 
April 20, 2009 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ba2eaec-2bb1-11de-b806-00144feabdc0.html> 
20 “Hungary: Request for Stand-By Arrangement”, IMF Staff Report, No. 08/361, November 17, 2008, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22493.0>;   
“Georgia: Request for Stand-By Arrangement”, IMF Staff Report, No. 08/328, October 6, 2008, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22403.0>;   
“Republic of Latvia: Request for Stand-By Arrangement”. IMF Staff Report, No. 09/3, January 9, 2009, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22586.0>;  
“Republic of Serbia: Request for Stand-By Arrangement”, IMF Staff Report, No. 09/20, January 23, 2009, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22640.0>;  
“Republic of Belarus: Request for Stand-By Arrangement”, IMF Staff Report, No. 09/109, April 3, 2009, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22853.0>. 
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TABLE 5 
Current account deficit as a percent of GDP and fiscal stimulus plans 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Countries with current account deficit between 5 and 22 percent of GDP 
in 2008, AND fiscal stimulus+ social policies 
Country  2006 2007 2008
1  Fiscal stimulus
2  Employment and 
social policies
3 
Bahamas  -25.0  -21.9  -15.1  X   
Barbados  -8.7 -7.2 -9.9     
Costa Rica  -4.9  -5.8  -7.8  X  X 
Dominican Republic  -3.6 -5.4 -13.5     
El Salvador  -3.6  -5.5  -6.1  X  X 
Guatemala  -5.0 -5.0 -5.8  X  X 
Guyana  -19.4  -18.2  -22.2  X   
Honduras  -4.7 -10.0  -13.9  X  X 
Jamaica  -11.7  -16.4  -16.0  X  X 
Nicaragua  -13.6 -18.3 -23.9  X  X 
Panama  -3.2  -8.0  -11.7  X   
1/  Projections         
2/ Includes tax cuts or increased subsidies, and or spending increased or brought 
forward 
 
3/ Promotion of job creation and or social programs    
Source: Data from “The reactions of Latin American and Caribbean governments to the international 
crisis: an overview of policy measures up to 20 February 2009,” Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, United Nations, Chile, February 2009; and from the International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008.  
 
It is worth noting that a recent survey from the United Nations ECLAC
21 shows about half 
the economies in Latin America and the Caribbean using some form of fiscal measure to 
stimulate economic activity in 2008 or 2009; the specific measures take the form of tax cuts 
or government spending. Table 5 lists eleven countries in the same study with a current 
account deficit between 5 and 22 percent of GDP in 2007. In nine out of eleven cases, the 
survey found the use of fiscal stimulus, while six cases (within this group) report the use of 
employment and social policies. 
 
Thus, expansionary fiscal policy is being used to stimulate economic activity (or to prevent 
activity from shrinking) in various countries that do not have IMF agreements, even where 
there are signficant current account deficits. As noted above, the purpose of external 
assistance in recessionary conditions should be to enable these counter-cyclical policies, not 
just to protect the balance of payments or reduce inflation. 
                                                 
21 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. (2009). “The Reactions of Latin American and 
Caribbean Governments to the International Crisis: An Overview of Policy Measures up to 20 February 2009.” 
Chile: United Nations.  Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 18 
Macroeconomic Policy Traps 
 
One of the criticisms of the IMF during the Asian crisis was that it not only mishandled the 
crisis but that it also - together with its main overseer, the U.S. Treasury - played a major role 
in causing the crisis by supporting a number of deregulatory measures that removed 
restrictions on capital flows and encouraged foreign borrowing.
22 Similar policies, as well as 
others supported by the Fund, may have contributed to the vulnerabilities of emerging 
market and developing countries in the current crisis. 
 
For example, among the countries with recent IMF agreements Iceland, Latvia, and Hungary 
face one common difficulty: their private sector’s foreign debt is huge. This means that they 
are especially vulnerable to currency depreciation, because it causes both households and 
firms to face a serious deterioration of their balance sheets. This limits or precludes the use 
of currency depreciation as an adjustment to external shocks and fall-off in demand. 
 
Iceland and Hungary have had inflation targeting regimes since 2001. Ukraine did not adopt 
inflation targeting, but has committed, in a letter of intent to the IMF, to gradually move 
their monetary regime to one based on inflation targeting and flexible exchange rates. Latvia 
operates under a quasi-currency board system that has emphasized the maintenance of the 
currency peg; the system has been in operation for the last 15 years, and is seen as an 
important instrument to eventually enter the Euro zone. 
 
But inflation-targeting regimes (and also currency boards) are designed to turn the fight 
against inflation into the overwhelming priority of the monetary authorities. Under inflation-
targeting regimes, central banks raise interest rates to target a specific rate of inflation; but in 
so doing, they also attract capital inflows which tend to cause an appreciation of the 
currency. The latter encourages the accumulation of foreign debt in the private sector. Under 
a currency board, on the other hand, capital inflows do not appreciate the currency (relative 
to the one it has been pegged to), but can promote the acquisition of foreign debt by 
convincing the private sector that the exchange rate will not depreciate. 
 
Inflation targeting has been in use in a number of high-income countries for some years, and 
the IMF has recommended it in some developing countries including most recently, Ukraine, 
Armenia, and Serbia.
23 Also, due to their success in containing inflation pressures, the IMF 
has sometimes been supportive of pegged rates (as in the convertability system that operated 
for nearly a decade in Argentina –until it collapsed-, and as in the one that is in operation in 
Latvia), and similar or related dollarization systems (like the ones in Ecuador and more 
                                                 
22 Weisbrot, Mark. (2007) “Ten Years After: The Lasting Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis,” in Ten Years 
After: Revisiting the Asian Financial Crisis. Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. p 
105-118. 
23 For the Fund’s views on inflation targeting, see for example IMF (2006). “Inflation Targeting and the IMF.” 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (especially pages 9 and 11). Accessed online April 20, 2009 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/031606.pdf>. For a more critical view on the Fund’s 
emphasis on inflation controls and promotion of inflation targeting, see Epstein, Gerald. (2007). “Central 
Banks as Agents of Economic Development,” in Institutional Change and Economic Development. Helsinki: United 
Nations University. Should Reform be a Requirement for Increasing the Fund’s Resources? • 19  
 
                                                
recently in El Salvador).
24 But as seen above, these systems can promote a systemic 
vulnerability which can become critical when economies face terms of trade shocks, 
international credit crunches, or declines in demand for their exports. 
 
These regimes can therefore help create the vulnerabilities that make economies fragile, and 
also constrain the set of instruments that could be utilized in the event of a crisis or a sudden 
reversal of capital flows. 
 
 
24 The IMF has been very willing to support the implementation of dollarization regimes in developing 
countries. The Fund’s support to the Ecuadoran dollarization plan was instrumental in the renegotiation of 
their foreign debt at the end of the 1990s. See Fischer, Stanley. “Ecuador and the IMF.”  Speech at the Hoover 
Institution Conference on Currency Unions, Palo Alto, California, May 19, 2000. Accessed online on April 20, 
2009 < http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/051900.htm>. Elsewhere, Fischer has documented 
the emerging economies’ move toward fully flexible exchange rate systems, and towards hard pegs. See his 
speech “Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?” presented as Deputy Managing Director of the 
IMF, at the American Economic Association Annual Meeting. New Orleans. January 6, 2001. Accessed online 
on April 20, 2009 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/010601a.pdf>. The same favorable 
reaction was observed, by the IMF, as a result of El Salvadoran adoption of the US dollar as their currency. On 
the case of Argentina, the role of the IMF in supporting their currency board system has been examined in 
Mussa, Michael. (2002). “Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy,” Washington, DC: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics. Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 20 
The Question of Governance 
 
The IMF’s governance structure is much more reflective of the world of 1944, when it was 
established, than of the world today. The United States has 16.5 percent of voting shares, 
which gives it a veto over some issues; but more importantly, the U.S., Europe, and Japan 
together have a solid majority of 55.6 percent of the votes. Europe and Japan have almost 
never voted against the United States in 65 years of the IMF’s existence. Thus, the rich 
countries effectively run the organization, with the U.S. Treasury as the mostly unchallenged 
leader (despite the fact that the managing director of the IMF is by tradition a European). 
Low and middle-income countries have almost no significant voice.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Pre-Singapore IMF Voting Rights 
  
* High-income oil producing countries include: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Brunei, and Bahrain. 
Source: Bryant, Ralph C. (2008). "Reform of IMF Quota Shares and Voting Shares: A Missed 
Opportunity." Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/0409_imf_bryant/0409_imf_bryant.pdf> 
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FIGURE 2 
Current IMF Voting Rights 
 
* High-income oil producing countries include: Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Brunei, and Bahrain. 
Source: International Monetary Fund. (2008). "IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board 
of Governors."  <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm> 
 
There have been efforts for many years to reform the governance structure of the IMF. 
These finally bore fruit in the Singapore reforms of 2006.  Figures 1 and 2 shows the voting 
shares of the IMF before and after the Singapore reforms. As can be seen from the figures, 
after twelve years of efforts by reformers, the change is very slight. The United States share 
fell from 17 to 16.5 percent. China, which has the world’s second largest economy and 1.3 
billion people, went from 2.9 percent to 3.6 percent. South Korea and Singapore (combined) 
went from 1.2 percent to 1.7 percent. The rest of the changes were much smaller and 
basically insignificant. 
 
A number of governments have raised objections to giving more money to the IMF without 
a change in its governance structure to assure some significant representation to countries 
other than the handful of governments currently in control. At the G-20 meeting in London 
on April 2, the G-20 communiqué included a statement that was interpreted as saying that 
the head of the IMF will no longer have to be a European. However, without a change in Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 22 
the voting structure, it is not clear that this symbolic change will give developing countries 




Aside from the concentration of power in the hands of a few governments, with the 
decades-long tradition of the U.S. predominating among these, there is the problem of lack 
of accountability. As noted above, it is difficult to find evidence that Fund officials have 
been held accountable for the major mistakes that were made in the IMF’s handling of 
previous crises, especially in the late 1990s. Part of the reason is undoubtedly that the 
governments who control the Fund do not have any compelling incentive to hold the Fund 
accountable for mistakes that negatively impact other, less well-off countries. In fact, the 
incentives are in the opposite direction: to do so could call attention to mismanagement of 
the Fund, with the risk that culpability could eventually be laid at the doorstep of the G-7 
governments that are the decision-makers. 
 
The Fund’s procedures also make accountability very difficult. Policy is formulated in a way 
in which it is not clear who is responsible when things go wrong. One way to change this 
would be to require the IMF, in its loan agreements, to provide baseline projections for what 
the path of the economy would be in the absence of the agreed-upon policy changes. The 
Fund would also have to provide projections for the same variables – e.g. GDP growth, 
unemployment, inflation – if the recommended policies were adopted.  These are procedures 
that are followed by the bipartisan Congressional Budget Office in the United States. With 
these projections, there would be something that the results of the IMF program could be 
measured against for evaluation. Of course, results will differ from the projections because 
of unforeseen events; but we would not expect the actual results to be consistently worse 
than the projections. If they are, then something might be wrong with the policies.
25 
 
The use of baseline and program-contingent projections would also allow the borrowing 
government and the public to see what sacrifices they might be asked to make and for what 
expected gains. If the program promises a short-term loss of 0.3 percent of GDP for a 2 
percentage point gain next year and the following year, that might be considered worth the 
sacrifice. But an initial loss of 3 percent of GDP, with consequent increases in 
unemployment and poverty, might be considered too much for the same promised gains. 
The procedures currently in place do not allow for this kind of discussion or evaluation. 
 
The use of baseline and program-contingent projections by the IMF would also allow 
governments to evaluate the track record of specific economists or teams of economists. 
 
For the present, in the context of a world recession and the IMF’s agreements that include 
procyclical policies, a more immediate reform may be in order. The Fund should be 
prohibited from attaching procyclical conditions for countries that are in recession or at 
serious risk of a recession, unless it can demonstrate that such conditions cannot be 
                                                 
25 See Weisbrot, Mark and Dean Baker. (2004). “Applying Economics to Economists: Good Governance at the 
International Financial Institutions.” Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research. Accessed 
online on April 20, 2009 <http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/applying-economics-to-
economists-good-governance-at-the-international-financial-institutions/> Should Reform be a Requirement for Increasing the Fund’s Resources? • 23  
 
postponed or adopted more gradually without irreparable harm to the borrowing country’s 
economy. 
 
It will be difficult to guarantee that even these reforms would prevent the Fund from 
imposing inappropriate macroeconomic policies, in the absence of more thorough 
governance reforms. However, they would at least provide a basis for future evaluation and 
efforts to promote accountability and reform. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the present situation, the agreements signed since 
last year should be re-opened for revision. They were negotiated when the IMF had very 
little in the way of resources. If the Fund’s resources are to be greatly expanded, at the very 
least it can afford to supply more foreign exchange to ease the adjustment process, and allow 





This brief review of current practices and decision-making embodied in recent IMF 
agreements finds that the Fund’s current policy decisions and orientation remain similar to 
those of the 1990s, when the Fund’s mistakes had a serious negative impact on a number of 
developing economies. Neither the IMF nor its principal overseer, the U.S. Treasury 
Department, have acknowledged past mistakes or agreed to reforms that would prevent a 
recurrence.  
 
This has implications for the immediate future of the affected countries, because procyclical 
policies can exacerbate the world economic downturn.  But more importantly, the proposed 
quadrupling of IMF resources will have implications for many years to come, even after the 
world economy recovers. Although the new resources are unlikely to reverse the trend of 
governments avoiding, whenever possible, the Fund’s lending and influence, they will help to 
re-establish an unreformed IMF as a major power in economic and decision-making in low-
and-middle income countries, with little or no voice for these countries in the IMF’s 
decisions. This could have long-term implications for growth, development, and social 
indicators in many countries. Governments that are contributing to this increase in funding 
should think carefully about these implications and the possibilities of making such increases 
contingent on serious reforms of the IMF – especially in the areas of governance and 
accountability. Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2009 • 24 
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